Bagha Jatin 1879—1915

Chapter Four

A global war,
an Indian plan

In 1914 the British Empire went to war in Europe. To a small number of Indian revolutionaries, that was not distant news. It was the first genuine strategic opening in a generation — and they had roughly a year to use it.

The reasoning

An empire fighting for survival in Europe would be thin everywhere else.

The requirement

Arms, money, and a coastline where a ship could land unobserved.

The partner

Germany, for whom unrest in British India was a war aim in itself.

The result

Nothing arrived. The plan was compromised before it reached the coast.

Context

Anti-colonial politics goes international

By 1914 Indian revolutionary activity was no longer confined to India. Networks of students, exiles and emigrant workers connected Calcutta to Berlin, San Francisco, Tokyo and the Dutch East Indies.

The First World War turned those loose connections into something with a strategic logic. Germany had an obvious interest in unrest inside the British Empire, and was prepared to supply money and weapons to encourage it. Indian revolutionaries had an equally obvious interest in accepting.

Historians generally treat these efforts collectively as the Indo-German, or Hindu–German, conspiracy. It was not one plan but several, running in parallel across continents, coordinated imperfectly and often not at all.

Portrait of Jatindranath Mukherjee wearing a checked shawl over one shoulder.
Plate 01 Jatindranath Mukherjee. He was thirty-four when the war began.

Sequence

How the plan was supposed to work

Set out at the level of intent and outcome. This site does not describe operational detail, materials or technique.

Establish a channel abroad

In April 1915, Narendranath Bhattacharya — later internationally known as M. N. Roy — met Jatindranath and then travelled to Batavia, in the Dutch East Indies, to open negotiations with German representatives for financial aid and arms.

Maintain cover at home

A Calcutta trading concern operating as the Universal Emporium, connected to the firm Harry & Sons, provided a commercial reason for correspondence with contacts overseas. An import business that writes to Java is unremarkable; a revolutionary who does so is not.

Bring a shipment to the coast

Arms were to reach India by sea. The vessels associated with the wider scheme — the Annie Larsen and the SS Maverick — appear throughout the historical literature on the Indo-German conspiracy. Neither delivered a cargo to India.

Be in position to receive it

Jatindranath moved to the Odisha coast, taking a hideout outside Kaptipada in the princely state of Mayurbhanj, more than thirty miles from Balasore. The location was chosen for its proximity to an expected landing point.

The step that never came

The shipment did not arrive. What arrived instead was the police. The waiting is the part that is usually skipped in retellings, and it is the part that decided the outcome.

Failure

Why nothing arrived

The plan did not fail at the Odisha coast. It had already failed thousands of miles away.

Intelligence work in the United States compromised the wider scheme. The network organised by the Czech activist Emanuel Voska gathered information on German activity and passed it to British and, subsequently, American authorities. Once the shipping arrangements were known, the operation had no chance of arriving unobserved.

There were also structural problems. The plan required a long chain — negotiators in Java, financiers in Berlin, ships crossing the Pacific, receivers on an Indian beach — in which every link had to hold, over months, using communications that were slow and interceptable. It relied on a foreign power whose interests overlapped with Indian independence only temporarily and only partially.

And it depended on a small number of people staying hidden in unfamiliar country for an indefinite period. That is where it ended.


On assessing the plan

It is tempting to judge the 1915 effort as naive because it failed. The people involved were working with limited information, no diplomatic standing and a closing window. Whether a better plan was available to them is a genuinely open question, and one that historians answer differently.

Scope of this page

This chapter deals with political and diplomatic history. It deliberately contains no description of weapons, explosives, covert technique or operational method, and nothing here is intended to be actionable in any modern sense.

Profile photograph of Jatindranath Mukherjee looking upward.
Plate 02 In profile. Among the last surviving likenesses made in his lifetime.

By August 1915 the plan was already lost. Nobody on the Odisha coast knew it yet.

What follows is a chapter about waiting, about a shrinking margin, and about five men in country they did not know.

Chapter Five · The Road to Balasore